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Norton and Subramaniam: India’s Wars: A Military History 1947–1971

Americans. What happened? Why was
there such a fundamental change? Why
were the Japanese unable to sustain
these traits later in the war? Books
that challenge the received wisdom are
always fun, and this one only increases
the interest in the next two translations.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

India’s Wars: A Military History 1947–1971, by
Arjun Subramaniam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 576 pages. $40.

Air Vice-Marshal Arjun Subramaniam
is not a man to shy away from challenges. In India’s Wars, he attempts to
explain in one volume the creation,
evolution, and employment of India’s
armed forces during the first quarter
century of its independence. He
succeeds remarkably well, and this
volume likely will be the best example
of its genre for the foreseeable future.
India’s Wars is more than an impressive
chronological discussion of battles
fought and mostly won. Subramaniam
also examines questions and issues of
high strategy and national identity. For
example, he examines how a country
led by the heroically popular pacifist
Jawaharlal Nehru could create a joint
military consisting of former colonial
regiments with long and storied
traditions, elements of the Indian army
that had fought alongside Japanese
troops in World War II, and air and
naval forces. This section of the book
looks at India’s martial past during the
precolonial and colonial periods.
The book then follows a chronological
path, examining major military actions. Subramaniam looks hard at the
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first Indo-Pakistan War, of 1947–48.
Responsibility for initiating the war is
placed solely on Pakistan. Associated
chapters feature detailed descriptions
of India’s attempts to hold ground in
Jammu and Kashmir. Useful maps
accompany every battle description.
It is easy to forget, except in the wellknown example of Jammu and Kashmir,
that the boundaries of modern India
were not permanently established at partition. The princely state of Hyderabad
chose not to join greater India and opted
to continue as an independent state.
Similarly, Portugal did not relinquish
its city colony of Goa on India’s west
coast. When efforts at political solutions increasingly appeared doomed to
fail, the government decided to settle
both situations via military means.
The 1962 India-China war is examined
thoroughly with as much attention
to this Indian defeat as is given to
earlier victories. Subramaniam identifies
political failures on the basis of unrealistic expectations regarding Chinese
intentions and miscalculation of Chinese
capabilities. Mistakes in operational dispositions and tactics are faced squarely.
Subramaniam’s best writing covers
the 1965 war with Pakistan. He
carefully explains Pakistan’s strategic
and operational preparation for the
conflict, including an alliance with
the United States, modernization of
the Pakistani armed forces with U.S.
equipment, and substantial improvement of such capabilities as close air
support. Although Pakistan was unable
to field as many divisions as India,
Subramaniam makes a convincing
case that the acquisition of Patton
tanks, better artillery, and F-86 fighterbombers gave Pakistan a qualitative
edge. Subramaniam also makes a point
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of crediting Air Marshal Asghar Khan of
the Pakistani air force as responsible for
significant improvements in his service.
The role of paramilitary mujahideen
is discussed in detail, Subramaniam
arguing that these forces were largely ineffective in sparking popular uprisings.
He also looks at the opposing navies,
and attributes lack of any real Indian
naval campaigns to the unavailability of
INS Vikrant, India’s sole aircraft carrier,
during the period of hostilities.
Subramaniam provides clear descriptions of combat actions, supported by
adequate maps and occasional pocket
biographies of key personalities. He
candidly admits to failures of Indian intelligence, and notes that Pakistani forces
experienced similar problems. Indian
mistakes and losses are cataloged carefully, as are those of Pakistan. He draws
extensively from personal interviews,
unit war diaries, and secondary sources.
The book concludes with the liberation
of Bangladesh. Although Pakistan is
identified as responsible for widespread
human rights abuses in what was then
East Pakistan, Subramaniam recognizes
that Indian leaders from Indira Gandhi
on down recognized the greatly improved strategic situation India would
face if Pakistani forces were removed
from a shared eastern border. The war’s
depiction follows Subramaniam’s pattern
of explanatory description, buttressed by
maps. He examines the rapid collapse of
Pakistani forces in Bangladesh and military operations along the West Pakistan–
Indian border. Subramaniam provides
a careful examination of the naval war
and mentions the roles of militia forces,
intelligence, and covert operations.
Regrettably, Subramaniam stopped
his examination of India’s military at
1971. His excellent ability to analyze
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and explain would have been welcome
in looking at the role of the Indian
military during the national emergency
of 1975 to 1977. An examination of the
impact of India’s nuclear capabilities on
doctrine, strategy, tactics, and forces also
would be a notable addition to this work.
Taken in its entirety, the picture India’s
Wars paints of the evolving Indian military is a flattering one. Modern military
prowess rides comfortably on proud
traditions and achievements of the past.
If a reader detects a certain satisfaction
on the part of the author, it is as well
deserved as it is understandable.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the
Men of France and Spain Who Saved It, by Larrie
D. Ferreiro. New York: Random House, 2016. 464
pages. $18.

In the past, Larrie Ferreiro has
combined his expertise in military
history with his extensive knowledge of
naval architecture to produce unique
interpretations of eighteenth-century
events that shaped our world. Building
on the impressive scholarship in works
such as his Ships and Science and
The Measure of the Earth, Brothers at
Arms combines familiar accounts of
French officers who served with the
Continental Army with descriptions
of the contributions of other French
and of Spanish officials without whose
assistance the newly created United
States likely would not have survived.
The book begins with the interesting
assertion that the courts of Europe,
particularly the Bourbon monarchies
of France and Spain, were the principal audience for the Declaration of

2

